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Procedure for the Protection of Civil
Aircraft in Flight
SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL*
I. INTRODUCTION
International civil aviation faces the challenge of guaranteeing
the security of aircraft in flight. Most breaches of security involve
terrorist acts perpetrated by hijackers or saboteurs who either
physically seize the aircraft in flight and force it to deviate from its
scheduled destination,' or cause it to disintegrate in mid-air.2 Past
incidents gave rise to international concern, and nations and inter-
national organizations have taken concerted actions to protect the
safety of air transport.3 Nations have agreed on rules that regulate
the conduct of states in the arrest, extradition, prosecution, trial,
and punishment of terrorists involved in the incidents.4 Tokyo,5
The Hague,6 and Montreal 7 have hosted diplomatic conferences to
* B.A. Hons., B.C.L., M.A., D.Phil., D.C.L. (Oxford); Docteur en Droit (Paris);
LL.M. (Harvard); of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law; Member of the Panels of Concil-
iators and of Arbitrators of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes, World Bank; Former Member and Special Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission; Distinguished Professor of International and Comparative Law, Golden Gate
University School of Law.
1. This type of offence against an aircraft in flight has been labeled "hijacking." Sev-
eral incidents of aircraft seizure have taken place, involving such airlines as TWA, Air
France, KLM, Japan Airline, and Garuda. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 [hereinafter The Hague
Convention].
2. For a treatment of these types of incidents, including the explosion of Air India
over the Atlantic Ocean and Pan American over Lockerbie, Scotland, see generally Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
3. See Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
4. See generally Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League
of Nations Doc. C.546(I) M.383(I) (1937); Compendium of Relevant International Instru-
ments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/368, at 18-22 (1983), reprinted in RICHARD B. LmLICH, TRANS-
NATIONAL TERRORIsM: CONVENI-ONS AND COMMENTARY 175-99 (1982). See also
Sompong Sucharitkul, International Terrorism and the Problem of Jurisdiction, 14 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 141 (1987).
5. See generally Tokyo Convention, supra note 3.
6. See generally The Hague Convention, supra note 1.
7. See generally Montreal Convention, supra note 2.
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adopt conventions designed to provide measures to preempt and
frustrate any illegal seizure and sabotage of commercial aircraft,
especially those in flight carrying civilian passengers. Most nations
that operate national flag carriers have become parties to each of
these conventions. Signatory nations include, but are not limited
to: France (Air France), India (Air India), Japan (Japan Airlines
and ANA), Korea (Korean Air), Kuwait (Kuwait Airlines), the
Netherlands (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines), Russian Federation
(Aeroflot), Singapore (Singapore Airlines), Thailand (Thai Air-
ways International), United Kingdom (British Airways), and the
United States (Pan American Airways, TWA, etc.).
Legal writers and nations unanimously agree on the need to
suppress and prevent the occurrence of such wanton destruction of
aircraft. 8 There is strong public support for stopping such incidents
because they so often result in unnecessary loss of life and prop-
erty. In spite of concerted international actions, incidents of hi-
jacking and sabotage have not subsided; thus, efforts to stop these
occurrences continue. Therefore, we must focus our attention on
preventing aerial incidents that are deliberately directed against in-
nocent civilian passenger airlines.
This Article will propose rules, principles, and guidelines for
nations to follow in order to protect civilian aircraft. Nations that
destroy civilian aircraft must be held responsible for their actions
regardless of whether the destruction was intentional. Two recent,
notorious incidents stand out that require public attention and fur-
ther in-depth investigation. This Article is intended to explore ef-
fective ways to prevent repetition of such incidents in the future
and the litigation that frequently ensues.9 Accordingly, this Article
will discuss two competing principles of international law: (1) pos-
sible intrusion of national territorial airspace; and (2) possible mis-
reading of the path of an aircraft in flight.
8. See generally Sucharitkul, supra note 4; Sompong Sucharitkul, Terrorism as an
International Crime: Questions of Responsibility and Complicity, 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. Rrs.
247 (1989); Yoram Dinstein, Terrorism as an International Crime, 19 IsR. Y.B. HuM. RTS.
55 (1989).
9. The author would like to emphasize that this Article is not intended to place any
blame on any entity or person nor to provide ex post facto remedies to compensate for
losses already suffered.
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II. PROCEDURES FOR THE TREATMENT OF AN UNIDENTIFIED
AIRCRAFT FOUND WITHIN NATIONAL AIRSPACE
Several commercial airlines have either been shot down in
mid-air10 or forced to land in an unfriendly territory. Upon land-
ing, the captain and crew were subjected to prosecution and trial,
which invariably resulted in undeserving prison terms."
In most cases, the ill-fated airlines happened to carry an Asian
flag. It does not appear that either the registration or destination,
or the position of the aircraft in terms of geographical coordinates,
was a relevant factor for the occurence of the incidents. Sadly, it
would seem that "might" continues to be "justice," as the applica-
tion of international air law remains haphazard, allowing for arbi-
trary and primitive acts of destruction to continue with impunity.
Moreover, the laws in the making are also not entirely free from
prejudices. A "hit and run" is a heinous crime in any national legal
system. To destroy a harmless civilian object and murder innocent
civilians, and then to attempt to justify such a cowardly act on the
ground of self-defence, self-protection, or national security, is to
add insult to injustice, not to mention the agony and sufferings of
the injured victims and their bereaved families.
A. The Incident of September 1, 1983, and Its Consequences
On September 1, 1983, two Soviet missiles shot down Korean
Airlines Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan, killing all passengers and
crew. This incident was the most tragic aerial incident in the his-
tory of international civil aviation.12
10. See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HAGUE 91 (3d ed. 1986). Instances
of earlier incidents include the shooting of El Al Airlines by Socialist countries, as in the
Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Isr. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 127 (May 26) (judgment on the
preliminary objections). For a discussion of the same incident, see also (U.S. v. Bulg.),
1960 I.CJ. 146 (May 30); (U.K. v. Bulg.), 1959 I.C.J. 264 (Aug. 3). For other aerial inci-
dents, see 10 Mar. 1953 (U.S. v. Czech.); 7 Oct. 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.); 4 Sept. 1954 (U.S.
v. U.S.S.R.); 7 Nov. 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.).
11. This occurred in 1978 when the Soviets fired upon and forced the crash landing of
a 707 airplane, killing no passengers. Marian Nash Leich et al., Agora, The Downing of
Iran Air 655, 83 A.J.I.L. 318, 323 (1989). Compare Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and
Crew of the United States of America (U.S. v. Hung.; U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), in INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 91.
12. Passengers included Americans, Australians, British, Canadians, Japanese, Thais,
and South Koreans. See U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., 2470th mtg. at 47, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2470
(1983). For further details of the debates in the Security Council, see U.N. SCOR, 37th
Sess., 2471st mtg. at 1-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2471 (1983); U.N. SCOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Does.
S/15947 (letter from the U.S. Permanent Representatives to the U.N. of Sept. 1, 1983), S/
1994] 515
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While many have hypothesized possible scenarios, authorities
have established certain facts regarding this incident. The point of
departure of Flight 007 on this ill-fated voyage was New York, and
Seoul was its scheduled destination. When shot down, the plane
was apparently off-course. 13 Official investigations on the incident
have produced only contradictory and inconclusive findings.
One theory alleges that Flight 007 penetrated the Soviet terri-
torial airspace while it was off-course. 14 What is confusing is the
Soviet response to the intrusion. For reasons not known, Soviet
ground command ordered the downing of Flight 007, without first
signaling a shot to alert the aircraft that it was off-course. 15
One question of primary importance is the legitimacy of the
action taken by the territorial state allegedly in self-defence. Self-
defence is justified only if it is absolutely necessary and if there are
no immediately avoidable alternatives. The ground command had
other alternatives from which to choose. It could have warned the
approaching Korean aircraft or, at a minimum, escorted it out of
Russian territorial airspace if, indeed, the aircraft was at that mo-
ment within its territorial airspace. Instead, the ground command
ordered the attack on the Korean aircraft without due warning and
without any showing of mercy or regret.
Because the Soviet action was not necessary for self-defence,
it violated principles of international law. Furthermore, the re-
sponse of the Soviets violated the principle of proportionality and
exceeded their stated objective of simply removing the intruding
aircraft.' 6 The incident had several interesting consequences.
15948 (note by the President of the Security Council), S/15949 (note by the President of the
Security Council answering the letter of the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea
to the U.N.), S/15950 (letter from Japan), S/15951 (letter from Australia) (1983), reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 1111-13.
13. See International Civil Aviation Organization: Action with Regard to the Down-
ing of the Korean Air Lines Aircraft, 22 I.L.M. 864 (1983).
14. See Soogeun Oh, Liability for International Aviation: Aerial Incidents and War-
saw Convention of 1929, Presented to the Regional Meeting of American Society of Inter-
national Law at Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California (Mar.
19-20, 1992).
15. See Interception of Civil Aircraft, 22 T.L.M. 1185-87 (1981) (attachment A). But
see Stuart M. Speiser, Update: Korean Air Lines Flight 007 Litigation, 2 INT'L L. BULL., Fall
1984, at 45. The chart utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense for military aircraft had
a more stringent precautionary statement: "Aircraft may be shot down without warning."
16. See e.g., LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 14. It states: "Legitimate defense
implies the adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the danger." See also
Naulilaa Case, 2 Trib Arb. Mixtes 1012 (Port.-Ger. 1928).
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B. The International Community's Reaction
The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("U.S.S.R.")
refused to participate in a proceeding before an international
court. The Soviet authority kept its own record and submitted its
findings to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation ("ICAO"). 17 Based upon these findings, the ICAO con-
ducted an independent investigation with the cooperation of
affected member countries. A number of international organiza-
tions have protested against the U.S.S.R. and the ICAO.
1. The Security Council
Immediately following the incident on September 1, 1983, the
United States, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Japan, and Austra-
lia petitioned the meeting of the Security Council to discuss the
Soviet use of weapons against an unarmed Korean commercial air-
craft in flight. On September 12, 1983, the U.S.S.R. vetoed a draft
resolution which deeply deplored the destruction of the Boeing
747. The resolution had called for an investigation by the Secre-
tary-General and urged the cooperation of all states with the ap-
propriate specialized agencies to strengthen the security and safety
of international civil aviation.' 8
2. Unilateral Counter-Measures
In response to the destruction of the Korean aircraft by Soviet
missiles, the United States, on September 16, 1983, prevented So-
viet Aeroflot flights from landing in New York and New Jersey. 19
The aircraft was carrying a Soviet Foreign Minister and other mem-
bers of the Delegation to the General Assembly. The U.S. delega-
17. See Report of I.C.A.O. Fact-Finding Investigation, 23 I.L.M. 865 (1983) (report by
A.I. Oknowsky, the Chairman of the Accident Investigation). The Report concludes that
the South Korean airplane was engaged in a preplanned intelligence-gathering and provoc-
ative mission. Id.
18. For the text of the Security Council debate, see 22 I.L.M. 1114-47 (1983). The
Draft Resolution received nine votes in favor (France, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Paki-
stan, Togo, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zaire), two votes against (Poland
and U.S.S.R. (veto)) and four abstentions (China, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe).
Id. at 1148.
19. See Joint Statement by the Governors of the States of New Jersey and New York,
22 I.L.M. 1215 (1983) (instructing the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to deny
a request by the U.S. State Department to permit two airplanes carrying Soviet diplomats
to land in Newark or Kennedy Airports).
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tion explained that this landing was diverted in order to ensure the
safety and security of the incoming Soviet delegates.
Then-President Ronald Reagan further expressed the U.S.
Government's displeasure when he suspended negotiations of a
consular convention with the U.S.S.R. and failed to renew bilateral
agreements on cultural, scientific, and transport exchanges.20 In
addition, the United States took measures to close the Aeroflot
offices in Washington, D.C. and New York, thereby suspending all
commercial operations of Aeroflot in the United States.2
1
3. Regional Inter-Governmental Sanctions
The proposal of economic sanctions against the U.S.S.R. did
not command the necessary unanimity within the NATO Council
because France, Greece, Spain, and Turkey did not concur in the
sanctions. 22
4. Sanctions by NGOs
The International Federation of Airline Pilots Association
("IFAPA") adopted a recommendation on September 6, 1983, in-
viting members and national associations to suspend all flights to
the U.S.S.R. for sixty days. 23
5. Amendment to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation
The ICAO Assembly unanimously adopted the Amendment
to the Convention on International Civil Aviation with Regard to
Interception of Civil Aircraft ("Civil Aviation Amendment") at an
20. See United States Statements and Orders Concerning Soviet Aircraft and Con-
gressional Joint Resolution, 22 I.L.M. 1205-14 (1983).
21. See Order 83-9-43, adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board on September 8, 1983,
reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTncs BOARD REP. 1208-12 (1983) (appending then-President
Reagan's letter of September 8, 1983, reaffirming the suspension of Aeroflot flights to and
from the United States, in effect since January 5, 1982); Order 83-9-88, adopted by the Civil
Aeronautics Board on September 20, 1983, reprinted in CIVIL AERONAUTIcs BOARD REP.,
supra, at 1208-12.
22. See Djamel-Eddime Lakehel, Les sanction d la destruction du Boeing Sud-Corgen,
LE SOIR, Sept. 11, 1983, at 3 (stating the United Kingdom's proposal regarding sanctions
against all flights to and from Moscow). Ultimately, Spain, which had opposed the boycott,
actually suspended all air traffic with the U.S.S.R.
23. The IFAPA represented 57,000 pilots of airlines from 67 countries. See Action
Taken by the International Federation of Airline Pilots, 22 I.L.M. 1218-20 (1983) (released
Sept. 9, 1983).
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Extraordinary Session of May 10, 1984.24 This Amendment is cited
as Article 3 bis and referred to as the Montreal Protocol of May 10,
1984.25 The Amendment was to prevent the violation of other
states' airspace and the use of civil aviation for purposes inconsis-
tent with the aims of the Convention, and to enhance the safety of
international civil aviation. The Amendment reaffirms the princi-
ple of forbidding the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.
Paragraph (a) of Article 3 bis of the Protocol provides:
(a) The contracting States recognize that every State must re-
frain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of persons on
board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the
rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations ("U.N."). 26
It should be noted that, although this Amendment was unani-
mously adopted, it will not enter into force until it is ratified by 102
contracting states.27 To the extent that the Amendment discour-
ages the use of force in accordance with the principle set forth in
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,28 it can be argued that paragraph
24. International Civil Aviation Organization, Amendment of Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation with Regard to Interception of Civil Aircraft, 23 I.L.M. 705, 864-936
(1984) [hereinafter Civil Aviation Amendment]. A description of the destruction of the
Korean Air on September 1, 1983, is contained in the Amendment. See also The United
Nations Security Council Consideration, 22 I.L.M. 1109, 1109-1220 (1983).
25. The Assembly of the ICAO, at its 25th session (extraordinary) at Montreal on
May 10, 1984, adopted the proposed amendment in operative paragraph 2 to add a new
Article 3 bis. For the text of Article 3 bis, see 15 U.N.T.S. 295, 23 I.L.M. 705 (1984). See
also International Civil Aviation Organization: Resolution and Report Concerning the De-
struction of Iran Air Airbus on July 3, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 896 (1989) [hereinafter Report on
Iran Air].
26. Civil Aviation Amendment, supra note 24, at 706.
27. As of July 1989, 52 nations have ratified the Montreal Protocol. Fifty more ratifi-
cations are needed to bring into force the Amendment to the Chicago Convention on In-
ternational Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. See Report on
Iran Air, supra note 25, at 1060.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 2 states:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following principles:...
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
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(a) of Article 3 bis represents the existing rule of customary inter-
national law.
C. Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Air
Traffic Control
As part of their endeavors to avoid future repetitions of the
tragic incident of September 1, 1983, nations in the region con-
vened to discuss adoption of precautionary measures. In 1985,
delegations from the United States, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. met in
Washington, D.C., Moscow, and Tokyo to discuss practical steps to
be taken to enhance the safety of flights in the northern part of the
Pacific Ocean, or the Northern Pacific ("NOPAC") routes.29
The three delegations agreed to designate Anchorage, Alaska
(U.S.), Tokyo (Japan), and Khabarovsk (U.S.S.R.) as Area Control
Centers ("ACCs"), which operate as points of contact among the
air traffic control services of the United States, Japan, and the
U.S.S.R., respectively. The Tokyo ACC will serve as the principal
point of contact. To coordinate actions to assist a civil aircraft in an
emergency situation, the Anchorage and Tokyo ACCs will initiate
communications with the Khabarovsk ACC to provide all available
information regarding an aircraft assignedto a NOPAC route. This
will occur when they become aware of an aircraft's possible entry
into a U.S.S.R. flight information region ("FIR"). The ACC com-
munication facilities between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk
are now available on an around-the-clock basis.30
On November 19, 1985, in Washington, D.C., the ACCs con-
cluded an agreement that specifies steps and procedures to imple-
ment the terms of the Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding of
July 29, 1985.31 The agreement also prescribes, as a matter of pri-
ority, the procedures to coordinate actions among the air traffic
control services of the three countries. These procedures are cru-
cial to verifying unidentified aircraft, exchanging information re-
garding types of aircraft, establishing the plane's location (latitude/
29. These meetings were held in 1985 from February 26-March 3 (Washington, D.C.),
May 20-25 (Moscow), and July 17-29 (Tokyo). The Memorandum of Understanding was
entered into force on October 8, 1985. See Memorandum of Understanding, July 29, 1985,
25 I.L.M. 74-77 (1986).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 77-84.
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longitude), determining the pilot's intention, deciding what action
to take, and assisting identified aircraft.
32
Pending the entry into force of the unanimously adopted Civil
Aviation Amendment, 3 the agreement among the three Air Con-
trol Services has, thus far, succeeded in preventing the recurrence
of an aerial incident involving the destruction of a civil aircraft in
flight in the Northern Pacific routes. The agreement may even
serve as a model for other regions of the world. It has proved ef-
fective in dispelling suspicion that arises when an unidentified air-
craft appears in foreign territory without prior authorization. This
measure eliminates any need for the use of weapons or any forcible
measures that are harmful to human lives.
As suggested earlier, such a practical precautionary step con-
stitutes an effective countermeasure ex ante to ensure non-repeti-
tion of incidents that endanger the safety of international civil
aviation and add a new dimension to the "terror in the sky."
III. PROCEDURES FOR THE TREATMENT OF UNIDENTIFIED
AIRCRAFT IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE
The "terror in the sky" encountered by the Korean Air Flight
007 on September 1, 1983, was revisited almost five years later, on
July 3, 1988, by Iran Air Flight 655 in the Gulf of Persia. The
U.S.S. Vincennes, an American warship, caused this incident by its
deliberate actions.34 Like the Korean aircraft, the ill-fated Iranian
aircraft belonged to an Asian nation. Like the 269 passengers and
members of the crew of Korean Air Flight 007 who perished in the
Sea of Japan, Iran Air IR 655's 290 passengers and crew were all
killed.35 Once again, the plane was shot down without a warning.
The victims in the Korean Air incident were of Australian, Cana-
dian, Japanese, Korean, Thai, and American national origin.36 The
Iran Air incident included victims of Indian, Italian, Pakistani, Yu-
goslav, and United Arab Emirates origin. A particularly tragic fact
about this incident was the religious character of the voyage. Most
passengers were of Islamic faith, travelling that day to make a pil-
grimage to Mekka. Ironically, their interrupted journey deprived
32. Id.
33. See discussion supra part II.B.5.
34. For an account of the aerial incident of July 3, 1988, see Report on Iran Air, supra
note 25, at 896-943.
35. Id.
36. See discussion supra note 12.
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them and their bereaved families of the joy of attending religious
ceremonies at the shrines in Mekka and fulfilling the duties im-
posed by the Muslim faith. While several basic facts of the two
incidents are comparable, it is important also to examine the differ-
ences between the surrounding circumstances of the two aerial in-
cidents, including the subsequent reactions and measures
undertaken by nations.
A. Circumstances Surrounding the Incident of July 3, 1988
1. Circumstances Leading to the Incident
It is difficult to describe the state of affairs in the Gulf of Per-
sia preceding the incident of July 3, 1988. Nevertheless, it is even
more difficult to disregard certain unusual happenings in that pre-
cariously sensitive region following the outbreak of hostilities be-
tween Iraq and Iran at the dawn of that decade. It is not surprising
that, like in Kampuchea where several communist factions vied for
the exclusive control of the Buddhist land, in the Persian Gulf, two
predominantly Islamic states were violently opposed to each other,
basically on religious grounds. In both cases, the Western colonial
powers were responsible for the legacies of divisiveness left from
bygone days of occidental colonial empires. The use of force re-
mained the only means to settle regional and local differences at
the disposal of the warring authorities in the Persian Gulf.37
Accordingly, fierce fighting erupted between Iraqi and Iranian
forces, resulting in the loss of millions of lives on both sides. This
fighting culminated in the interdiction of maritime transport of
crude oil from the Persian Gulf, especially from Iraq, through Ku-
wait.38 The strategic geographical position of Iran permitted the
37. See Letter Dated 11 August 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Aug. 11, 1987,
U.N. SCOR, 42d Sess., Annex 1, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/19031 (1988). Paragraph 4 of the Annex
states: "Ironically enough, the initiation of the war by Iraq on 22 September 1980 and
occupation of a vast part of the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran was a breach of
world peace. The Security Council, however, chose to remain silent then." Id. para. 4.
This document explains in detail the position of Iran on Security Council Resolution 598,
S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987), reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1479 (calling for an
immediate cease-fire and an ultimate negotiated settlement). See 26 I.L.M. 1481-84 (1987).
For the position of Iraq on Resolution 598, see Letter Dated 14 August 1987 from the
Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretary-General, 26 I.L.M. 1485-87 (1987).
38. See S.C. Res. 598, supra note 37. The Resolution was unanimously adopted on
July 20, 1987, and the parties accepted the U.N. Secretary-General's visit to Iran and Iraq
on a peace mission. See id. For the factual situtation, see U.S. Plan To Reflag Kuwaiti
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nation to exercise control over the Straits of Hormuz. Japan, a dis-
tant third country, suffered the most, as net importer of crude oil
from the Persian Gulf, while the United States also suffered from
the marginal increase in the price of oil at the tail-end of private
consumption.39 Whatever the motivation, Western powers, led by
the United States, attempted to provide safe passage for the trans-
port of crude oil from Iraq by means of a strong naval presence in
the Persian Gulf. This presence was reinforced by the "reflagging"
of Kuwaiti tankers. These Kuwaiti tankers, carrying Iraqi crude,
sailed with American flags and registration. These measures, how-
ever, did not alleviate the gravity of the situation, which appeared
to have deteriorated further.40
The presence of foreign flags in the Persian Gulf during the
1980s caused confusion from a bird's eye view. For instance, the
U.S.S. Stark was mistaken for an Iranian frigate by an Iraqi inter-
ceptor pilot who, on May 17, 1987, fired two air-launch Exocet mis-
siles from an Iraqi Air Force F-1 Mirage, which struck the U.S.S.
Stark and caused considerable damage to the American ship.41
This was an incident of friendly fire, as the U.S.S. Stark was there
to provide protection for the safe passage of Iraqi crude. The Iraqi
Air Force admitted the mistake, and both sides agreed to a sum of
money as compensation for the crew-members of the U.S.S. Stark
who were killed or injured. For the forty or so casualties, the Ira-
qui Government paid thirty-five million U.S. dollars as compensa-
tion for the damage inflicted.42
Like the incident prior, there was neither warning from the air
nor from the sea. The losses were extensive; the U.S.S. Stark suf-
Ships, 26 I.L.M. 1429 (1987); Senator Nunn's Response to the Weinberger Report, 26
I.L.M. 1464-87 (1987).
39. See The Weinberger Report to U.S. Congress on Security Arrangements in the
Persian Gulf, 26 I.L.M. 1433, 1461-63 (1987).
40. For the question of the legitimacy of "reflagging" and "flag of convenience," see
FINAL Acr OF THIRD U.N. CoNFERENCE ON L. OF SEA, U.N. CONVENTION ON L. OF SEA
art. 92, at 31, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1982).
41. See U.S.S. Stark Hit by Iraqi Missiles, 87(2124), DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1987, at 58-
63, reprinted in Iran-Iraq War and Navigation in the Gulf, May 17-Aug. 11, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1423 (1987). The Secretary of State's letter to Congress on May 20, 1987 states that a total
of 37 members of the crew on the U.S.S. Stark were reported dead or missing, and two
more were seriously injured. 26 I.L.M. 1425-26 (1987). Then-President Reagan also
sought compensation for the ship. See White House Statement, May 18, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
1423 (1987).
42. For a discussion of the Gulf situation, see Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at
909-10.
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fered considerable casualties, as well as physical damage, which re-
quired it to return to base for major repairs. The possibility of
mistaking the identity of a ship or an aircraft was so great, espe-
cially in time of emergency and panic, that injurious consequences
easily ensued from the hasty, but deliberate, use of lethal weapons.
The U.S.S. Stark was not prepared for such an unannounced at-
tack, and this incident led to the position that U.S. forces should be
combat-ready in like circumstances, whatever the legal conse-
quences and complications. A preemptive strike, or a "shoot first
and verify the kill later" approach, appears to have become the
"rule of engagement," or the standing order of procedure. 43
Not unlike how the Korean Air plane tried to avoid being es-
corted down to a Soviet airport in 1983, the U.S.S. Vincennes was
not going to tolerate the complacency for which its captain could
be reprimanded. The Iraqi fighter was not identified, and it es-
caped without retaliation from the U.S.S. Stark. Such an insidious
and one-sided attack was not to be repeated against a U.S. man-of-
war, and all ships would be prepared for battle in such emergency.
Thus, the U.S.S. Vincennes was on alert, ready to meet any chal-
lenge. The captain of the U.S. warship was never again to be
reproached for inertia or neglect of duties.
It was unfortunate that Iran Air Flight 655 happened to cross
the deadly overflight path in international airspace; indeed, it was
ironic that the destruction was committed by a combat-ready man-
of-war patrolling the Persian Gulf to enforce safe passage of mari-
time transport.
Flight IR 655 left Bandar Abbas for Dubai more or less on
schedule."4 The departure was delayed twenty minutes due to an
immigration problem involving a passenger.45 The flight took off
at 06.47 hours and climbed straight ahead (A59 magnetic track 203
degrees). 46 Shortly after take-off, IR 655 contacted the Iran Air
office at Bandar Abbas and passed a departure message with an
estimate for Dubai.47 The flight also contacted Bandar Abbas con-
43. For a detailed discussion of this approach, see THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NWP 9, NWC 4206, § 4.3.2.1 (1987).
44. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 902.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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trol at 06.49:18 and reported climbing past 3,500 feet.4 8 At
06.54:11, IR 655 reported to Bandar Abbas approach control.49 No
further communication was received from IR 655 by Bandar Abbas
approach control, Tehran ACC, Emirates ACC, or Dubai approach
control.50
At 06.54:43, the Iranian aircraft was destroyed by two surface-
to-air missiles51 whilst climbing from FL 120 to FL 140 well within
airway A59, south of MOBET in the vicinity of Qeshum Island.
52
Of the 274 passengers, 238 were Iranian, 10 Indian, 1 Italian, 6
Pakistani, 13 United Arab Emirates, and 6 Yugoslav. The 274 pas-
sengers were comprised of 209 adults, 57 children, and 8 infants.
All 16 crew-members were Iranian.
5 3
No "red alert" status was in effect on July 3, 1988.54 Through
"red alert" procedure, ATS units are notified of military activities
that pose a risk to the safety of civil aircraft.55 When a "red alert"
is in effect, no ATC clearances are given to civil aircraft intending
to operate through the affected airspace.5 6 In some instances, Ira-
nian aircraft already en route have been recalled through "red
alert" procedure.5 7 On that tragic day, however, U.S. naval forces
did not notify the ATC units in Tehran and Bandar Abbas of any
activities at sea that could pose a risk to the safety of IR 655.58
2. Additional Complications
The decision-making process of the U.S.S. Vincennes' captain
was confused by further complications. Apparently, at the same
time that the IR 655 was in flight, Iranian boats belonging to the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard were involved in surface action with
three U.S. warships: the U.S.S. Vincennes (Guided Missile
Cruiser-AEGIS); the U.S.S. Elmer Montgomery (Knox class
48. Id. at 929 (estimating MOBET at 06.52, the FIR boundary (Darax) at 06.58, and
Dubai at 07.15).
49. Id. at 935 (passing MOBET out of FL 120).
50. Id. at 935-37.
51. Id. at 936.
52. Id. at 902, 924.
53. Id. at 903.
54. Id. at 912. On July 3, 1988, no "red alert" status was in effect, and the A.T.C. units
at Teheran and Bandar Abbas were unaware of any activities at sea.
55. Id. at 911-12.
56. Id. at 912.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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anti-submarine frigate); and the U.S.S. John H. Sides (Oliver Haz-
ard Perry class-guided missile frigate)59 According to the ICAO
report, the Iranian units had employed small boats of the Bogham-
mar and Boston Whaler types, each armed with one 12.7 mm.
machine gun, one RPG-7 rocket launcher, and one 106 mm. recoil-
less rifle.6° This additional information may have misled the U.S.S.
Vincennes to believe that the radar contact (IR 655) might be hos-
tile, in light of the possible Iranian use of air support in the surface
engagements with U.S. warships.
61
3. The Sequence of the Incident
IR 655 disintegrated in mid-air when two missiles exploded,
causing "[t]he tail and one wing [to break] off in the air."'62 What
was left of the aircraft landed in the sea, and the wreckage sank.
No survivor nor other damage was reported.63
The search and rescue did not begin until 07.18 hours, when
United Arab Emirates ACC contacted Tehran ACC and requested
the position of IR 655.4 "Recognizing that the flight had not ar-
rived at its destination, the controller at Tehran ACC contacted the
adjacent ATS units for information on the flight." 65 Search and
rescue action followed when Tehran could not obtain information
on the plane; the assistance of the United Arab Emirates was re-
quested. 66 Four aircraft from the United Arab Emirates partici-
pated in the search around Darax. Similar search and rescue
efforts were undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy
("IRIN"), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the National Iranian
Oil Company ("NIOL"), and the authorities at Bandar Abbas.67
The searchers located bodies and floating parts of the wreckage
more than 30 NM north of Darax, and AFTN informed the Emir-
ates ACC at 09.25 hours. At 10.30 hours, Bandar Abbas authori-
59. Id. at 923.
60. Id. at 908-09. See also id. at 901 (the U.S. report on the investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the downing of IR 655 on July 3, 1988).
61. Id. at 923-24.
62. Id. at 903.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 908.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id-
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ties took over and advised the United Arab Emirates that its
assistance in the search and rescue was no longer needed.
68
B. Reactions by the Parties and the International Community
In a study of state responsibility for the aerial incident of July
3, 1988, the analysis regarding rights and duties should cover all
three parameters: (1) the state committing the internationally
wrongful act; (2) the injured state or states; and (3) third states or
the international community. 69
1. Actions Taken by the State Committing an Internationally
Wrongful Act
At first glance, the conclusion that the United States was re-
sponsible for the aerial incident of July 3, 1988, seems irresistable,
even though few of the basic facts are known.
Regardless of fault or intention, international liability attaches
to the U.S. Government, as the injurious consequences arose out of
acts under the control and within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S. Vin-
cennes. This vessel was subject to U.S. law and jurisdiction. Thus,
there is international liability for the injurious consequences arising
out of the vessel's actions that destroyed IR 655 in international
airspace. Compensation for the physical and moral damages must
be paid to the Iranian Airlines and the families of the deceased.
Every state must pay for its own mistakes, misadventures, or acci-
dents it causes. Full compensation is due under any theory of dam-
ages, including damnum emergens and lucrum cessans.70
Under the law of international liability, the U.S. Government
is liable for the physical damage, destruction, and loss of life caused
by its action, regardless of fault or state responsibility. 71
68. Id.
69. See Willem Riphagen, Sixth Report on State Responsibility, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/389. See also Sucharitkul, supra note 8, at 247-58.
70. International liability is not based on the wrongfulness of the international act
that is attributable to the state, but rather on the injurious consequences arising out of the
acts. Thus, liability exists even if there are circumstances precluding wrongfulness. See
generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Seventh
Session, [1985] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 24, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/389.
71. See Article 35 (reservation as to compensation for damage of the draft articles on
state responsibility adopted at first reading by the International Law Commission), re-
printed in State Responsibility: Draft Articles Proposed by the Drafting Committee, [1980] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 270, 272, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318 [hereinafter State Responsibility].
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On the question of state responsibility, the act of firing mis-
siles at a regularly-scheduled commercial aircraft in flight in inter-
national airspace was clearly attributable to the U.S. Government.
Because the U.S.S. Vincennes fired missiles while in the service of
the United States, the chain of causation was uninterrupted.
The only plausible justification to excuse the United States of
liability would be "self-defence." Although this defence is inherent
under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the Article limits the occa-
sion for invoking the defence to when "an armed attack oc-
curred."72 In this incident, there was no possibility of an armed
attack against a missile-launching cruiser of a superpower nation.
Thus, the United States' reliance on a claim of self-defence appears
far-fetched.
Yet, international law has its own yardstick for self-defence,
including time and scope limitations and the principle of propor-
tionality. Every state is entitled to its own understanding of what
constitutes self-defence. Thus, the United States' understanding of
self-defence may diverge significantly from the standard rule of in-
ternational law.73 Whatever definition or notion of self-defence a
state has adopted, however, it must bear the risk of its own miscon-
ception under international law.74
The United States' first error was in the identification on the
radar screen of Airbus 300 as an F-14, a fighter aircraft.75 This mis-
reading led to grave consequences in the international arena. Be-
cause of this erroneous reading, the United States' reaction
mistakenly anticipated an impending armed attack that was, in re-
ality, impossible.
72. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
73. The United States' understanding of collective self-defence was rejected by the
International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4 (June 27). For a discussion of the invasion of Iran by U.S. military units on April 24
and 25, 1980, see U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
43 (May 24). The Court stated: "The Court therefore feels bound to observe that an oper-
ation undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to
undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations."
74. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. For an example of different tests of self-defence, see
the Caroline Case, 29 BRrr. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 1130-37; Robert Jenings, The Caroline and
McLeod cases, 32 A.J.I.L. 82 (1938). Compare the test of self-defence as proposed by the
United States, which was subsequently accepted, albeit reluctantly, by the United
Kingdom.
75. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 923. For causes of the misinterpretation
of the aircraft, see id. at 923-24.
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Apology by the United States was belatedly tendered, and the
offer of ex gratia compensation was frequently misunderstood.
76
As early as July 11, 1988, then-President Reagan offered ex gratia
compensation to the families of the victims who died in the Iranian
Airlines incident.77 Specific payments were proposed to compen-
sate the Governments of India, Italy, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and the
United Arab Emirates. The United States offered to pay 250,000
U.S. dollars for a full-time, wage-earning victim and 100,000 U.S.
dollars for each of the other victims. 78 The U.S. Government was
only willing to pay less than one-third of the amount that the Iraqi
Government had paid to the American victims on board the U.S.S.
Stark.79 Accordingly, it seems that Americans who perished in the
line of duty on board the U.S. man-of-war were considered more
valuable than Iranians and other victims. This discrepancy is not
easy to understand.
The United States' offer to pay ex gratia compensation is not
entirely unprecedented.80 Its implications, however, may vary
from case to case. Ex gratia literally means "out of grace" or "as a
76. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (3d ed.
1983). Compensation for personal injuries and economic losses resulting from contamina-
tion of Japanese fishing catches was expressly stated to be ex gratia. Id. See also Myres S.
McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Meas-
ures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955); Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Exper-
iments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955); The Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v.
Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 283, 459 (Dec. 20).
77. Compensation was discussed at length in the hearings held before the Defense
Policy Panel of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services. See
RICHARD S. WILLIAMSON, IRAN AIR 655: STEPS To AVERT FUTURE TRAGEDIES, H.R.
Doc. No. 119, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 52-77 (1988).
78. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 897, citing HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
COMM'N, IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 COMPENSATION, H.R. Doc. No. 100, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.,
at 1-77 (1988). For different ratings, see Doo Hwan Kim, Liability of Governmental Bodies
in International Civil Aviation, in THE HIGHWAYS OF AIR AND OUTER-SPACE IN ASIA 177,
189 (1992).
79. See The Iraqi Note to the United States on Compensation, May 20-21, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1422, 1428 (1987).
80. For instance, in the nuclear test incident in the Pacific of 1954, the U.S. Govern-
ment offered compensation ex gratia to Japanese fishermen. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note
76, at 322. Similarly, Chile also offered compensation ex gratia to the victims' family in the
Letelier's Case, without prejudice to the question of sovereign immunity in non-commer-
cial tort cases. See Chile-U.S. Commission Convened Under the 1914 Treaty for the Settle-
ment of Disputes: Decision with Regard to the Dispute Concerning Responsibility for the
Deaths of Letelier and Moffitt, done at Washington D.C., Jan. 11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1, 19-20
(1992). See also Leich et al., supra note 11, at 319. On July 14, 1988, then-President Bush
defended the U.S. position before the Security Council, claiming that the action of the
U.S.S. Vincennes was justifiable under the international law of self-defence. Id.
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matter of grace," implying that it is offered without admitting any
liability. It can also be offered gratuitously, notwithstanding the
question of state responsibility. This second implication does not
preclude wrongfulness, but is indicative of the state's readiness to
pay compensation without further proof and without establishing
wrongfulness. Whatever the intended implications, in the case of
IR 655, no clearly defined meaning of ex gratia compensation was
offered. At best, it cannot cover or preclude the United States'
responsibility, as every state is susceptible to state responsibility
and this responsibility exists outside and beyond any offer of com-
pensation ex gratia, with or without admitting commission of an
internationally wrongful act. There may be other attenuating cir-
cumstances that alleviate the punishment imposed upon individuals
responsible for downing a commercial airline.
All the facts discovered through international investigation
concur on one point-No criminal intent is attributable to the U.S.
Government. Mistaken identity, if not negligent or reckless, could
preclude the mens rea also essential to creating an actus reus. In
other words, the wrongful act attributable to the U.S. Government
could only be regarded as an international crime under two circum-
stances: (1) if deliberate intent to destroy a civil aircraft in ordinary
commercial flight is proven; or (2) if the firing authority negligently
or recklessly failed to distinguish between an unarmed civil aircraft
Airbus 300 and a fighter F-14 on an attacking run.81 The party
basing its action on false assumption must bear the risk of its own
failure to draw that basic distinction.82
2. Actions Taken by the Injured States
The principal injured party is clearly Iran. The aircraft was
Iranian, bore Iranian registration, and carried an Iranian flag.
There are also many co-injured states whose nationals fell victim to
this deliberate act of destruction.
81. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 909-18.
82. See State Responsibility, supra note 71, at 241. Every state is responsible for its
internationally wrongful act. Self-defence is only permissible in response to an armed at-
tack. Id.
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The rights of the injured states correspond to the duties of the
responsible state.8 3 These duties normally consist of three-dimen-
sional measures:
1. Ex nunc: immediate cessation of such harmful activities
2. Ex tunc: restitutio in integrum, reparations
3. Ex ante: apologies, satisfaction, assurance, or pledge and cor-
rection of measures to prevent recurrence of such internationally
wrongful acts.84
Because Iran failed to receive satisfaction from the U.S. Gov-
ernment, as an injured state it could exercise several options.
Other injured states include India, Italy, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and
the United Arab Emirates; they are also entitled to make interna-
tional claims for the loss of lives.85 These may conveniently be
treated in the context of the international community's response.
3. Responses from the International Community
a. The Security Council of the United Nations
First, Iran notified the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions and requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.86
The Security Council met on July 14, 15, 18, and 20, 1988 to con-
sider the question. On July 20, 1988, the Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 616, which contained the following five opera-
tive paragraphs:
(1) Expresses its deep distress at the downing of an Iranian air-
craft by a missile fired from a United States warship and
profound regret over the tragic loss of innocent lives;
(2) Expresses its sincere condolences to the families of the vic-
tims of the tragic incident and to the peoples and Govern-
ments of their countries of origin;
(3) Welcomes the decision of the International Civil Aviation
Organization... to institute an immediate fact-finding of...
the chain of events relating to the flight and destruction of
the aircraft .... ;
(4) Urges all parties to the Chicago Convention of 1944 on In-
ternational Civil Aviation [15 U.N.T.S. 295] to observe to
83. See, e.g., Comments of Government on Part 1 of the Draft Articles on State Respon-
sibility for International Wrongful Acts, [19811 2 Y.B. Irr'L L. COMM'N. 71, U.N. Docs. A/
CN.4/342, A.1-4.
84. See Riphagen, supra note 69.
85. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 897.
86. Id at 896.
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the fullest extent, in all circumstances, the international
rules and practices concerning the safety of civil aviation, in
particular, those of the annexes to that Convention, in order
to prevent the recurrence of incidents of the same nature;
(5) Stresses the need for a full and rapid implementation of its
resolution 598 (1987) .... 87
It is significant that the support for the Resolution was unani-
mous. It is also important that both the United States and Iran
announced that they would cooperate with the ICAO's fact-finding
investigation."
b. The Actions Taken by the ICAO
On March 17, 1989, at the 20th meeting of its 126th session,
the Council of ICAO adopted a resolution inter alia.89 This Reso-
lution urged all states to take necessary action for civil aircraft nav-
igation safety, particularly by assuring effective coordination of
civil and military activities.90 In the Resolution, the Council reaf-
firmed the fundamental principle of general international law re-
quiring states to refrain from resorting to the use of weapons
against civil aircrafts. The Council also appealed to all states to
ratify the Protocol introducing Article 3 bis into the Convention on
Civil Aviation.91 The Resolution instructed the Air Navigation
Commission to study the safety recommendations contained in the
report of the fact-finding investigation of November 198892 and to
report to the 126th session of the Council on any measures it con-
siders necessary.
The Fact-Finding Investigation of the ICAO made the follow-
ing recommendations concerning measures that could be consid-
ered ex ante:
87. S.C. Res. 616, U.N. Doc. S/RES/616, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 896 (1989). Resolution
616 was unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council on July 20, 1988. See Report
on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 896.
88. See S.C. Res. 616, supra note 87, para. 3.
89. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 898.
90. See id. at 924-25.
91. See I.C.A.O. Res., 126th Sess., 20th mtg., 28 I.L.M. 898 (1989); Decision of
I.C.A.O. Council, 125th Sess., 14th mtg., 28 IL.M. 898-99 (1989) (appealing urgently to "all
states which have not yet done so to ratify, as soon as possible, the Protocol introducing
Article 3 bis and the Convention on Civil Aviation").
92. 28 I.L.M. 900-25 (1989).
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4.1 In areas where military activities potentially hazardous to
civil flight operations aircraft take place, optimum
functioning of civil/military coordination should be
pursued. When such military activities involve States not
responsible for the provision of air traffic services in the
area concerned, civil/military coordination will need to
include such States. To this end: (inter alia)
(a) Military forces should, initially through their
appropriate State authorities, liaise with States and
ATS units in the area concerned ....
(e) Military units should be equipped to monitor
appropriate ATC frequencies to enable them to
identify radar contacts without communication ....
(f) If challenges by military units on the emergency
frequency 121.5 MHz become inevitable, these should
follow an agreed message with content operationally
meaningful to civil pilots .... 93
c. Institution of a Proceeding Before the International
Court of Justice
Iran filed an application on May 17, 1989, referring to the Chi-
cago Convention on International Civil Aviation,94 as amended,
and the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,95 as well as the decision
of the ICAO Council on March 17, 1989.96 Iran requested that the
Court adjudge and declare:
(a) that the ICAO Council decision is erroneous in that the
Government of the United States has violated the Chicago
Convention . . . as well as Recommendation 2.6/1 of the
Third Middle East Regional Air Navigation of ICAO;
(b) that the Government of the United States has violated Arti-
cles 1, 3 and 10(1) of the Montreal Convention; and
(c) that the Government of the United States is responsible to
pay compensation to the Islamic Republic, in the amount to
be determined by the Court, as measured by the injuries suf-
fered by the Islamic Republic and the bereaved families as a
93. Id. at 924-25.
94. See Report on Iran Air, supra note 25, at 896; Aerial Incident of July 3, 1988 (Iran
v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
95. See Tokyo Convention, supra note 3; The Hague Convention, supra note 1; Mon-
treal Convention, supra note 2.
96. See Decision of I.C.A.O. Council, supra note 91.
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result of these violations, including additional financial
losses which Iran Air and the bereaved families have suf-
fered for the disruption of their activities. 97
As the matter is sub judice in the International Court of Jus-
tice, the discussion of the dispute should be postponed, pending
judicial pronouncement on the case's merits.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the procedures recommended by the Spe-
cialized Agency of the United Nations for handling civil aircrafts
that enter a national airspace or fly over a warship reveals essential
similarities. The bottom line is the same in both cases: they reflect
the necessity to accord top priority to safety. Regardless of the
circumstances, no weapon may be used against a civil aircraft in
flight. This prohibition is absolute.
In the incident of September 1, 1983, the alleged grounds for
firing the missiles against Korean Air Flight 007 were the protec-
tion of national security and the defence of territorial sovereignty.
The absurdity of these justifications are so self-evident that even
the commanding officer who had ordered the downing of the Ko-
rean aircraft, decided to leave his post. The irony of that incident
was that the Republic of Korea obtained no satisfaction from any
quarters, except for the reactions from the international commu-
nity and the unanimous adoption of Article 3 bis of the Chicago
Convention of 1944. The Trilateral Agreement among the ACCs
on the Pacific Route was a positive step in the right direction. Nev-
ertheless, Korean Air had to pay compensation for the loss of its
own passengers' lives in certain cases, even beyond the Warsaw
system's limits. It is all the more ludicrous that the former U.S.S.R.
paid nothing, and then, subsequently, received three billion U.S.
dollars in assistance from the Republic of Korea; only slightly more
than half that amount pledged by the Group of Seven.
The second incident on July 3, 1988 was radically different.
There was no possible excuse of a national airspace violation. The
United States also cannot claim that a warship is a floating territory
and is, therefore, a security zone akin to territorial airspace. Fur-
97. See Iran Brings a Case Against the United States, Communiqud from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice No. 89/6 (May 17, 1989) (unofficial press release, copy on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal); Aerial Incident of 3
July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
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thermore, the argument of self-defence is untenable. This argu-
ment is based on a self-induced error of an impossible scenario-
that defensive measures could in any way have been legitimately
taken to destroy an unarmed civil aircraft in routine commercial
flight. Whatever the missing link in the chain of communication
causing the mistaken identity of the Airbus, the government re-
sponsible for the damage must bear the consequences of its
mistake.
Reactions from third parties have been uniform. The interna-
tional community not only expressed regret, but also deplored the
wanton destruction of the civil aircraft and the loss of human lives.
Furthermore, such acts of terror intensified and augmented public
fear for international civil aviation. State terrorism and its tactics
of deliberately shooting civil aircraft in flight should not be toler-
ated. There is no excuse for such terrorism. The status of a state as
a "superpower" does not exempt that state from responsibility.
The days of "gun-boat diplomacy" are long gone. The existence of
a "superpower," once an inevitable necessity to preserve the deli-
cate balance of power, has now become obsolete.
To respect and protect human rights, the right to life of inno-
cent civil passengers on aircraft must be preserved. If a sacrifice
has to be made, national pride for the territorial integrity against
intrusion of airspace should be the first to go. Furthermore, the
need for any challenges against civil aircraft in routine flight must
be eliminated. Such challenges violate the fundamental human
rights of hundreds of passengers to have and enjoy their lives free
from acts of terrorism and arbitrary executions without due process
of law.
The safety measures this Article recommends are, in fact, le-
gally enforceable. Such enforcement remains to be strengthened
further by all peace-loving nations in the interest of safe interna-
tional civil air-transport. It is the author's submission that, for the
peace and security of mankind, no military necessity is ever admis-
sible that impairs the integrity and dignity of men or that interrupts
the free and innocent passage of civil aircraft in flight through na-
tional and international airspace.
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